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Abstract. The phenomenal concept strategy (PCS) is widely regarded as the most 
promising physicalist defence against the so-called epistemic arguments—the 
anti-physicalist arguments that establish an ontological gap between physical and 
phenomenal facts on the basis of the occurrence of epistemic gaps in our 
descriptions of these facts. The PCS tries to undercut the force of the epistemic 
arguments by attributing the occurrence of the epistemic gaps to the special 
character of phenomenal concepts—the concepts by means of which we think 
about our phenomenal experiences. In this essay, the author examines David 
Chalmers' master argument against the PCS and the objections raised against this 
argument by Peter Carruthers, Bénédicte Veillet and Katalin Balog in defending 
the PCS. While the author finds these objections to be successful defences of the 
PCS, the author shares Balog's belief that in this regard, the debate between the 
physicalists and anti-physicalists is a stalemate.  
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Introduction 
 
Various arguments challenge the view of physicalism that the fundamental facts 
that make up reality are solely of the physical type. Foremost among these 
arguments are those that show that there are gaps, called epistemic gaps, between 
our physical descriptions (descriptions of physical facts) and phenomenal 
descriptions (descriptions of phenomenal facts) and that these gaps are 
necessarily brought about by a corresponding gap in the realm of facts, in 
particular by an ontological gap between physical facts and phenomenal facts. 
The idea behind such arguments, which we shall refer to as the epistemic 
arguments, is that if there is an ontological gap between physical facts and 
phenomenal facts, then neither type of facts is derivable from or reducible to the 
other type, and therefore both types of facts are equally fundamental. If so, then 
physicalism is false.  
 
There are two basic ways by which physicalism can be defended from the 
epistemic arguments. One is to deny that there really are these epistemic gaps; the 
other is to accept the reality of these gaps but reject the idea that they are 
necessarily brought about by an ontological gap. The most promising execution 
of the latter argument is referred to by Dan Stoljar (2005) as the phenomenal 
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concept strategy (henceforth, the PCS). This strategy preserves the intuition that 
we have these epistemic gaps in our descriptions of physical and phenomenal 
facts but attributes the occurrence of these gaps to the peculiar nature of 
phenomenal concepts—referring to the concepts by which we think about our 
phenomenal experiences.  
 
In this paper, the author focuses on the PCS as a way of defending physicalism 
from the epistemic arguments. The author analyses an argument that claims that 
this strategy, in any form or version, is bound to fail. The author is referring to 
David Chalmers' famous master argument (2007), which has generated critical 
reactions from proponents of physicalism and the PCS. In particular, the author 
examines whether this argument is defensible from the objections raised against 
it by Peter Carruthers and Bénédicte Veillet (2007) and Katalin Balog (2011) 
and, consequently, whether Carruthers, Veillet and Balog, who are all proponents 
of the PCS, are successful in their defence of the PCS against the master 
argument. The author divides the discussion into three sections. In the first 
section, the epistemic arguments are introduced. Next, the author explicates the 
notion of phenomenal concepts, discusses how the PCS is intended to work and 
presents the main outlines of Chalmers' master argument. After that, the author 
examines the objections raised by Carruthers, Veillet and Balog against the 
master argument in defence of the PCS. On the whole, the author finds these 
objections successful in defending the PCS. However, the author concurs with 
Balog that in this regard, the debate between the physicalists and non-physicalists 
is a stalemate.  
 
The Epistemic Arguments 
 
The epistemic arguments are intended to show that physicalism is false. Before 
examination is made on how these arguments work in rejecting physicalism, let 
us first be clarified what is meant by "physicalism" and the aspect or aspects of 
physicalism to which the epistemic arguments are addressed. To begin with, 
physicalism is part of a larger philosophical problem that arises from our desire 
to understand the nature of reality. There have been various approaches to this 
problem; one is to determine whether the fundamental facts that make up reality 
are physical, mental or both. By physical facts, we generally mean the types of 
facts typically exemplified by the facts that the table is brown, the sun has risen 
and the author has just read a paper at a conference. Conversely, mental or 
phenomenal facts refer to the types of facts typically exemplified by the facts that 
my stomach aches, the author believes that it is going to rain, and the author feels 
good and relaxed while listening to the fugues of Bach.1  
 
In light of this approach, there are three contending ontological or metaphysical 
views, namely, physicalism or materialism, which claims that the fundamental 
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facts of reality are physical; mentalism or idealism, which claims that the 
fundamental facts of reality are mental or phenomenal; and dualism, which 
claims that the fundamental facts of reality can be divided into the physical and 
the mental. At present, the metaphysical debate or, as some would prefer to put it, 
the "ontology war" is between physicalism and dualism, that is, whether on the 
fundamental level of reality there are only physical facts, or there are phenomenal 
facts in addition to physical facts. Idealism, or the rejection of physical facts, 
which was previously supported by scholars such as Berkeley, is no longer a 
viable option.  
 
Physicalism, upon which the scientific worldview is premised, is argued on 
various grounds, one of which is its coherence with the principle of parsimony—
that it tries to explain natural phenomena with a minimum number of concepts 
and posited entities. Another ground is that the objects that it accepts as real are 
directly accessible to our five senses and hence are things that we can know 
objectively and verify. These grounds can be areas of dispute among 
metaphysicians, but the epistemic arguments are not addressed to them. The 
epistemic arguments are addressed to a principle of physicalism that has been 
called, following Frank Jackson (see Balog 2011, 3), the Physicalist Entailment 
Thesis, according to which a complete physical truth metaphysically necessitates 
or entails by metaphysical necessity all other conceivable types of facts, 
including phenomenal facts. A simpler way of putting this thesis is that if we 
know all of the truths about physical facts, then we can derive or deduce from 
these truths all of the truths about other types of facts. Using a familiar example, 
if we know all of the physical truths about colour vision, or the physics of 
colours, we can derive phenomenal truths about perceiving colours from these 
physical truths, such as what it feels like to see certain colours. In this regard, our 
knowledge of phenomenal truths is a priori in that we get to know them prior to 
our actual experience of seeing colours. 
 
How do the epistemic arguments work? Here is the main line of reasoning. First, 
these arguments claim that there are gaps in our descriptions of physical facts and 
our descriptions of phenomenal facts. Such gaps are called epistemic gaps, and 
they come in three forms: the knowledge gap, the explanatory gap and the 
conceptual gap. Second, the arguments claim that these epistemic gaps are 
brought about by a corresponding gap, called an ontological gap, between 
physical facts and phenomenal facts. The idea is that if there is an ontological gap 
between physical facts and phenomenal facts, then phenomenal facts are not 
metaphysically necessitated by or derivable from physical facts, and if so, then 
phenomenal facts are as fundamental as physical facts; hence, physicalism is 
false. The logical structure of the epistemic arguments actually takes the form of 
a modus tollens: if physicalism is true, then the physicalist entailment thesis is 
56                  Napoleon M. Mabaquiao, Jr.   
true; but the physicalist entailment is false (due to the epistemic gaps), therefore, 
physicalism is false.  
 
We now examine the three forms of epistemic gaps. First, the knowledge gap 
states that knowing all of the physical facts about conscious experiences does not 
enable us to know what it is like to undergo these experiences. This gap 
essentially represents Frank Jackson's knowledge argument (see Jackson 2003; 
2008). According to this argument, if a person, say Mary, knows all of the 
physical facts about seeing the colour red prior to actually seeing it, Mary still 
would not know what it is like to see the colour red. It is only upon actually 
seeing the colour red for the first time that she will know what it feels like to 
actually see the colour red. Thus, there is a gap between her knowledge of all of 
the physical facts about seeing the colour red and her knowledge of the 
phenomenal fact of what it is like to see the colour red. According to this 
argument, such a gap exists only because there is an ontological gap between 
physical facts and phenomenal facts. 
 
Second, the explanatory gap states that a completely physical explanation of how 
brain states function does not enable us to explain the phenomenal character of 
these states; e.g., why in a certain brain state we feel dizzy or excited (see Levine 
1983). Finally, the conceptual or conceivability gap states that the conceivability 
of a world physically identical to ours but phenomenally different—either 
because our world's phenomenal facts are absent or are inverted in this 
hypothetical but possible world—leads to an explanatory gap such that 
phenomenal facts, in this case, cannot be explained in terms of physical facts. 
The conceivability gap, as shall be observed, ties in with the explanatory gap; the 
conceivability gap simply presents a different explanation for why there is an 
explanatory gap between physical facts and phenomenal facts.  
 
The conceptual gap forms the basis of the conceivability arguments involving 
zombies and inverted qualia. The basic reasoning behind the zombie argument 
(see Chalmers 1996) is that if we say that B is explainable in terms of A, then it 
should be that we cannot conceive of a situation wherein there is A but there is no 
B. For instance, if water is explainable in terms of H2O, then it should be that we 
cannot conceive of a situation wherein there is H2O and there is no water. In the 
case of the physicalist claim that consciousness or phenomenal facts are 
explainable in terms of certain physical facts, the question is whether it is 
conceivable that these physical facts obtain but there is no consciousness. 
Chalmers believes that a world where all of the physical facts obtain but there is 
no consciousness (the zombie world) is conceivable or, on the level of individual 
persons, that it is conceivable that the author has a physical duplicate that is not 
conscious or does not have my phenomenal states (my zombie twin). If so, then 
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consciousness or phenomenal facts are not explainable in terms of physical facts 
or my consciousness is not explainable in terms of my physical attributes.  
 
In the case of inverted qualia, the basic idea is that, if it is conceivable that the 
author and another person have the same physical attributes but have inverted 
qualia or phenomenal experiences, say, what the author sees as red, he sees as 
blue, and what the author sees as blue, he sees as red, then our phenomenal 
experiences are not explainable in terms of our physical attributes. In other 
words, if our phenomenal experiences are explainable in terms of our physical 
properties, and we have the same physical properties, then we should have the 
same phenomenal states, and it should not be conceivable that we have inverted 
states. Thus, the conceivability (or possibility) of two physical duplicates having 
inverted phenomenal experiences implies that phenomenal states are not 
explainable in terms of physical properties. The case would be the same for two 
functional duplicates who have inverted qualia—their qualia would not be 
explainable in terms of their functional properties.  
 
The PCS and Chalmers' Master Argument  
  
There are basically two ways by which physicalists can respond to the epistemic 
arguments. One is to deny the existence of the epistemic gaps, for without these 
gaps the epistemic arguments simply cannot take hold. In denying the epistemic 
gaps, the ontological gap that allegedly gives rise to these epistemic gaps is 
automatically denied as well. This line of defence is taken by physicalists that 
Chalmers (2007, 169) classifies as "Type-A materialists".2 One prominent 
physicalist who belongs to this camp is Daniel Dennett (2006). The other way is 
to accept the occurrence of the epistemic gaps but deny that such gaps necessarily 
entail an ontological gap. This line of defence is taken by physicalists that 
Chalmers (2007, 169) classifies as "Type-B materialists".3 Proponents of the 
phenomenal concept strategy (PCS), which is considered to be the most 
promising way of carrying out the second line of physicalist defence against the 
epistemic arguments (Chalmers 2007, 172), belong to this camp. This strategy 
refutes the claim that the epistemic gaps are necessarily entailed by an 
ontological gap by attributing these epistemic gaps to the special character of 
phenomenal concepts. What then are phenomenal concepts? What accounts for 
their special character? Given the special character of these concepts, how does 
the PCS work? 
 
Phenomenal Concepts and the PCS 
  
According to Balog (2011, 5), phenomenal concepts are "concepts in terms of 
which we think about qualia". Chalmers (2010, 251) defines phenomenal 
concepts in the context of their relationship to phenomenal beliefs as follows: 
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"Phenomenal beliefs always involve phenomenal concepts: concepts of the 
phenomenal character of an experience. When one believes that one is having a 
red experience, one deploys a phenomenal concept of a red experience". In the 
following, Stoljar (2005, 469) explains how a phenomenal concept differs from 
closely related types of concepts:  
 
A phenomenal concept is the concept of a specific type of 
perceptual or sensory experience where the notion of experience 
is understood phenomenologically. So, for example, the 
phenomenal concept RED SENSATION is the concept of the 
specific type of sensation one gets from looking at red things 
such as British pillar-boxes or the Chinese flag. The concept 
RED SENSATION is not then the concept RED, for that concept 
typically qualifies objects not sensations. Nor is it the concept 
SENSATION THAT REPRESENTS THINGS AS RED, for 
there is no contradiction in the idea of a red sensation that did not 
represent things that way. Nor even is it the concept THE 
SENSATION ONE GETS FROM LOOKING AT RED 
THINGS, for that sensation might not have been a red sensation. 
 
What makes these concepts special or different from other types of concepts, 
particularly from those of the physical type? Proponents of the PCS have 
different conceptions of the features that account for the special character of 
phenomenal concepts. For instance, in his review of these conceptions, Chalmers 
(2007, 172) examines the views that regard phenomenal concepts as 
recognitional, indexical, quotational and as distinctly different from physical 
concepts in terms of their conceptual roles. For our purposes, we focus on two 
basic conceptions. The first concerns the manner by which phenomenal concepts 
are constituted or formed. Accordingly, phenomenal concepts are constituted or 
formed through direct acquaintance with or direct experience of the phenomenal 
experiences that they refer to. Balog (2011, 6) explains this idea as follows:  
 
Phenomenal concepts have a number of unique features. The 
sense that there is something special about phenomenal concepts 
is very closely connected to features of the epistemic access they 
afford to qualia. When we deploy phenomenal concepts 
introspectively to some phenomenally conscious experiences as 
it occurs, say a phenomenal experience of the colour blue, we are 
said to be acquainted with our experience. While philosophers 
have understood "acquaintance" in various ways, it is generally 
taken to be a unique epistemological relation that relates a person 
to her own mental states directly and, according to some, in a 
way that reveals the essence of the referent. 
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Stoljar (2005, 470–471) provides a similar explanation: "What, according to the 
phenomenal concept strategy, is the difference between phenomenal concepts and 
other concepts? Different versions of the strategy proceed differently… [b]ut at 
least for initial expository purposes, it is reasonable to see them as expressing a 
view concerning phenomenal concept possession I will call the experience thesis: 
… S possesses the (phenomenal) concept C of experience E only if S has actually 
had experience E. According to the experience thesis, I have the phenomenal 
concept RED SENSATION, only if I've actually had a red sensation". 
 
The second conception concerns how phenomenal concepts relate to non-
phenomenal concepts. According to Carruthers and Veillet (2007, 2), "[w]hat is 
said to be distinctive of such concepts is that they are conceptually isolated from 
any other concepts that we possess, lacking any a priori connections with non-
phenomenal concepts of any type (and in particular, lacking such connections 
with any physical, functional, or intentional concepts)". Being conceptually 
isolated, phenomenal concepts therefore cannot be derived from non-phenomenal 
concepts. These two features, it shall be observed, are closely related in that what 
makes phenomenal concepts conceptually isolated is the particular way they are 
constituted. More particularly, if the only way by which phenomenal concepts 
can be formed is through a direct experience of the phenomenal experiences that 
they refer to, then they cannot be formed by means of an a priori entailment from 
non-phenomenal concepts of any type. For instance, in the case of Mary, if it is 
only by means of a direct experience of the colour red that she acquires a 
phenomenal concept of the colour red, then her phenomenal concept of the colour 
red is conceptually isolated from her non-phenomenal concepts of the same 
colour (which constitute her complete knowledge of the physics of colour red) in 
that her phenomenal concept of the colour red cannot be derived from her non-
phenomenal concepts of the same colour.  
 
How does the PCS work? According to the proponents of this strategy, the 
epistemic gaps, contrary to the claim of the epistemic arguments, are not brought 
about by an ontological gap but by the peculiar nature of our phenomenal 
concepts. More specifically, the epistemic gaps are not due to a gap between 
physical facts and phenomenal facts but to a gap between physical concepts and 
phenomenal concepts, and this gap between physical concepts and phenomenal 
concepts is precisely brought about by the absence of a priori connections 
between these two types of facts, or by the nature of phenomenal concepts to be 
conceptually isolated. On this account, the reason why knowledge of what it is 
like to see colours from a complete physical knowledge of colour vision, why a 
complete physical explanation of brain states will not explain why these states 
come with a phenomenal character, and why our physical duplicate can be 
conceived to be non-conscious is that the concepts we use to refer to our 
phenomenal or conscious experiences are conceptually isolated. According to the 
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proponents of the PCS, the mere possibility that this account of how the 
epistemic gaps come about is correct is enough to block the inference (made by 
proponents of the epistemic arguments) from the epistemic gaps to an ontological 
gap.  
 
The Master Argument 
 
The PCS has been regarded as a very powerful physicalist defence against the 
epistemic arguments. However, Chalmers (2007) develops a master argument 
that shows that the PCS, in any form, is bound to fail. Speaking of the PCS, 
Chalmers (2007, 168) remarks, "I think that the strategy cannot succeed. On close 
examination, we can see that no account of phenomenal concepts is both 
powerful enough to explain our epistemic situation with regard to consciousness 
and tame enough to be explained in physical terms". Chalmers (2007, 172) lays 
out the general structure of the PCS as follows: 
 
Proponents put forward a thesis C attributing certain 
psychological features—call these the key features—to human 
beings. They argue (1) that C is true: humans actually have the 
key features; (2) that C explains our epistemic situation with 
regard to consciousness: C explains why we are confronted with 
the relevant distinctive epistemic gaps; and (3) that C itself can 
be explained in physical terms: one can (at least in principle) 
give a materialistically acceptable explanation of how it is that 
humans have the key features.  
  
The psychological features that the proponents of the PCS attribute to humans, 
which C symbolises, are allegedly what bring about the special character of 
phenomenal concepts. These psychological features, as it were, constitute the 
cognitive condition that humans must be in4 for them to have these phenomenal 
concepts with the special character attributed to these concepts by proponents of 
the PCS. Balog (2011, 10) describes the argument as follows: "C stands for the 
claim that we possess phenomenal concepts with the relevant key feature (e.g., 
being constituted by an instance of the referent) posited by a physicalist account 
of phenomenal concepts". For the PCS to succeed, given that humans do possess 
the psychological features that C symbolises, it must be shown, according to 
Chalmers, that C possesses a dual nature, that, on the one hand, it is explainable 
in physicalist terms, and on the other, it can explain why we have the relevant 
epistemic gaps. The former is what makes the PCS a physicalist strategy, while 
the latter is what makes it a strategy of type-B materialism.  
 
How does Chalmers attack this general structure of the PCS? Chalmers (2007, 
173) examines the relationship between the two features that make up the dual 
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nature of C and eventually argues that they are incompatible because one 
necessarily eliminates the other. Referring to these two features as "(2)" and 
"(3)", Chalmers (ibid.) writes, "I will argue that no account can simultaneously 
satisfy (2) and (3). For any candidate thesis C about psychological features of 
human beings, then either (1) C is not physically explicable, or (2) C does not 
explain our epistemic situation with regard to consciousness". That is to say, for 
Chalmers, if C is physically explicable, then C cannot explain why we have the 
relevant epistemic gaps, but if C can explain these epistemic gaps, then C cannot 
be physically explicable.  
 
We now present Chalmers' master argument. Given that P stands for the totality 
of our world's physical facts, C for the thesis that humans possess the 
psychological features necessary for having phenomenal concepts, and P & ~C 
for a possible world where all of the physical facts obtain but not the 
psychological features necessary for humans to have phenomenal concepts, the 
master argument is stated as follows (ibid., 174): 
 
1. If P&~C is conceivable, then C is not physically 
explicable. 
2. If P&~C is not conceivable, then C cannot explain our 
epistemic situation. 
_____________ 
 
3. Either C is not physically explicable, or C cannot explain 
our epistemic situation. 
 
As an instance of a constructive dilemma, it should be observed that there is 
actually a hidden premise here: "Either P & ~C is conceivable, or it is not". In 
this regard, the master argument, in its complete form, is actually as follows: 
 
If P & ~C is conceivable, then C is not physically explicable. 
If P & ~C is not conceivable, then C cannot explain our 
epistemic situation. 
 
Either P & ~C is conceivable, or it is not. 
_____________ 
 
Either C is not physically explicable, or C cannot explain our epistemic 
situation.  
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To further show the logical form of this argument: 
 
Given:  
 S  : P & ~C is conceivable 
~S  : P & ~C is not conceivable 
~Q  : C is not physically explicable 
~R  : C cannot explain our epistemic situation 
  
Chalmers' Master Argument: 
 S ⊃ ~Q 
 ~S ⊃ ~R 
 S v ~S 
 ----------------- 
 ~Q v ~R 
 
The dilemma, containing two horns [(1) If P & ~C is conceivable, then C is not 
physically explicable; (2) If P & ~C is not conceivable, then C cannot explain our 
epistemic situation], is valid. However, how does Chalmers argue for these two 
horns of the dilemma? More specifically, what justifies his reasoning? It is not 
difficult to see that the entire master argument is based on his zombie hypothesis 
or the conceivability reasoning concerning this hypothesis, which we discussed 
earlier in relation to the notion of a conceptual gap. Chalmers himself (2007, 
173–174) makes this clear when he remarks, "Here the key question will be: is P 
& ~C conceivable? That is, can we conceive of beings physically identical to us 
(in physically identical environments, if necessary) that do not have the 
psychological features attributed by thesis C? One might approach this question 
by asking: Would zombies have the key features attributed by thesis C? Or at 
least by asking: Is it conceivable that zombies lack the key features?" We 
elaborate on this statement when we discuss the objection of Carruthers and 
Veillet against the master argument because the link between the master 
argument and the zombie hypothesis is a crucial consideration in this objection.  
  
In any case, the critical implication of the master argument is that the first horn 
shows that the PCS is inconsistent with physicalism, while the second horn 
shows that the PCS is inconsistent with type-B materialism. More specifically, 
the first horn demonstrates the failure of the PCS as a physicalist defence against 
the epistemic arguments, while the second horn demonstrates the failure of the 
PCS as a type-B materialist defence against the epistemic arguments. Insofar as 
the PCS is intended as both a physicalist and a type-B materialist defence against 
the epistemic arguments, the PCS is shown to be a failure in either horn.  
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Two Objections to the Master Argument 
 
As expected, proponents of the PCS replied to Chalmers' master argument. In this 
section, we examine the objections raised against the master argument by Peter 
Carruthers and Bėnėdicte Veillet (2007) and Katalin Balog (2011) in defence of 
the PCS. Carruthers and Veillet attack the second horn of the master argument's 
dilemma by showing that Chalmers' explanation for it—that zombies and their 
conscious duplicates have different epistemic situations—is problematic, whereas 
Balog attacks the master argument as a whole by showing that it is not really a 
threat to physicalism in light of a physicalist distinction that can be made 
between physical and phenomenal conceptualisations of C. In the following 
sections, we examine the details of these two objections. 
 
On the Epistemic Situation of Zombies 
 
Carruthers and Veillet begin with the observation that the master argument 
equivocates between first-person and third-person phenomenal concepts, but they 
also show how the master argument can be reformulated to avoid this difficulty. 
After doing so, they proceed with their objection to the master argument. As 
noted above, Carruthers and Veillet object to Chalmers' explanation for the 
second horn of the dilemma, or why if P & ~C is not conceivable, then C cannot 
explain our epistemic situation. Chalmers' putative explanation (2007, 178) is as 
follows:  
 
4. If P & ~C is not conceivable, then zombies satisfy C. 
5. Zombies do not share our epistemic situation. 
6. If zombies satisfy C but do not share our epistemic 
situation, then C cannot explain our epistemic situation. 
 _____________ 
 
7. If P & ~C is not conceivable, then C cannot explain our 
epistemic situation. 
 
Using the case of Mary and Zombie Mary (the unconscious physical duplicate of 
Mary) as an illustration, Chalmers (2007, 179) further explains, "If P & ~C is not 
conceivable, then Zombie Mary has the psychological features attributed by C, 
but she does not share Mary's epistemic situation. So the psychological features 
attributed by C cannot explain Mary's epistemic situation, and more generally, 
cannot explain our epistemic situation with respect to consciousness". To clearly 
understand the specific objection of Carruthers and Veillet to Chalmers' complex 
explanation of the second horn of the master argument's dilemma, we dissect the 
explanation in three parts.  
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First, why is it that if P & ~C is not conceivable, then zombies also have (or 
instantiate) the psychological features attributed by C to humans? In other words, 
if P & ~C is not conceivable, then in all possible situations where there is P (the 
totality of physical facts), there will always be C. Thus, because zombies are 
possible physical entities (or are physical entities whose existence is possible or 
conceivable) and as such instantiate P, then zombies too must have C.  
 
Second, what justifies the reasoning that if Dave and Zombie Dave (the 
unconscious physical duplicate of Dave) have C but have different epistemic 
situations, then Dave's epistemic situation with respect to consciousness cannot 
be explained by C? Apparently, as noted above, the reason is that the master 
argument is significantly linked to Chalmers' zombie argument. It should be 
observed that the structure of the first horn of the dilemma follows or easily fits 
into the general structure of Chalmers' conceivability argument pertaining to 
zombies, namely, if we can conceive of A but not B, then B cannot be explained 
by A (again, the zombie argument runs as follows: if we can conceive of an entity 
having all of our physical attributes but not our consciousness, then our 
consciousness cannot be explained by our physical attributes). Thus, if we take P 
as A and C as B, then we have the following argument: if we can conceive of P 
but not C, then C cannot be explained by P. That is, if we can conceive of the 
totality of physical facts obtaining but not the psychological features required for 
humans to have phenomenal concepts, then these psychological features cannot 
be explained physically.  
 
With the second horn of the dilemma, the case is quite complex, but the link 
between the master argument and the zombie argument is more significant 
because this link not only involves the structure of its reasoning but also its 
content. Thus, if we take "Dave and Zombie Dave both having C" as A, while 
"Dave and Zombie Dave having the same epistemic situation" as B, then we have 
following argument: If we can conceive of Dave and Zombie Dave as both 
having C but not having the same epistemic situation, then Dave and Zombie 
Dave's respective epistemic situations cannot be explained by their possession of 
C. Thus, if Dave and Zombie Dave's respective epistemic situations cannot be 
explained by their possession of C, then Dave's epistemic situation cannot be 
explained by his possession of C, and therefore Chalmers' crucial premise for the 
second horn of the dilemma amounts to, "If zombies satisfy C but do not share 
our epistemic situation, then C cannot explain our epistemic situation". 
 
Third, when are the epistemic situations of Dave and Zombie Dave different or 
the same? Chalmers (2007, 177) explains that "two individuals share their 
epistemic situation when they have corresponding beliefs, all of which have 
corresponding truth-value and epistemic status". By "epistemic status", he (ibid., 
176) means that such beliefs are "justified or unjustified, and as cognitively 
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significant or insignificant". In this light, Dave and Zombie Dave have different 
epistemic situations because their beliefs about their phenomenal states have 
different truth-values and justifications. Because Dave is conscious while Zombie 
Dave is not, when they utter, for instance, the sentence "I am phenomenally 
conscious", Dave's sentence is true, while Zombie Dave's is false (ibid., 176–
177).  
 
Carruthers and Veillet challenge the third part of this explanation. According to 
them, it can be shown that Dave and Zombie Dave, contrary to the view of 
Chalmers, have the same epistemic situation. If so, then the second horn of the 
master argument's dilemma fails, and insofar as this horn is an integral part of the 
master argument, the master argument as a whole collapses. The crucial point 
here is Chalmers' qualification that the contents of the beliefs of two physical 
duplicates (Dave and Zombie Dave, for instance) do not affect the difference or 
similarity between the epistemic situations of these duplicates. Chalmers (2007, 
177) writes: 
 
A zombie will share the epistemic situation of a conscious being 
if the zombie and the conscious being have corresponding 
beliefs, all of which have corresponding truth values and 
epistemic status… It is important to note that this notion of 
correspondence does not require that corresponding beliefs have 
the same content… So the claim that a zombie and a conscious 
being share the epistemic situation does not require that their 
beliefs have the same content (author's italics). 
 
This part of Chalmers' argument is best illustrated by Putnam's twin-earth 
argument regarding the case of Oscar, who lives on normal earth, and Twin 
Oscar, who lives on twin earth, and the only difference between normal earth and 
twin earth is that the chemical composition of water in normal earth is H2O, while 
in twin earth it is XYZ. In this case, when Oscar and Twin Oscar utter the same 
sentence, "water is refreshing", their respective sentences are both true and 
justified in similar ways given their respective natural environments. 
Consequently, in regard to Chalmers, Oscar and Twin Oscar share the same 
epistemic situation despite the fact that the contents of their beliefs are not the 
same—Oscar's refers to a substance consisting of H2O, while Twin Oscar's refers 
to a substance consisting of XYZ.  
 
Carruthers and Veillet argue that on closer inspection, the case of Dave and 
Zombie Dave is no different from the case of Oscar and Twin Oscar. For 
Carruthers and Veillet, when Dave and Zombie Dave both utter the sentence, "I 
am phenomenally conscious"—which is the same as, "I have phenomenal 
states"—the contents of their beliefs are different: Dave's refers to his 
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phenomenal states or experiences, while Zombie Dave's refers to something 
else—states that have the same function as Dave's phenomenal states but not their 
phenomenal character. Using Chalmers' own terminology, these states of Zombie 
Dave can be called "schmenomenal states". Carruthers and Veillet, in particular, 
argue that Dave's belief about his phenomenal states (referring to his phenomenal 
states) is similar to Oscar's belief about water (referring to the substance 
consisting of H2O), while Zombie Dave's belief about his "phenomenal states" 
(actually referring to his schmenomenal states) is similar to Twin Oscar's belief 
about "water" (or twater) (actually referring to the substance consisting of XYZ). 
That being the case, the utterances of Dave and Zombie Dave of the sentence, "I 
have phenomenal states", similar to the utterances of Oscar and Twin Oscar of 
the sentence, "Water is refreshing", would be both true and justified in similar 
ways given their respective worlds (normal world and zombie world). What this 
conceptualisation means is that Dave and Zombie Dave, similar to Oscar and 
Twin Oscar, have the same epistemic situation. Speaking of the case of Chalmers 
and Zombie Chalmers, Carruthers and Veillet (2007, 11–12) summarise their 
argument as follows: 
 
The content of one of Chalmers' phenomenal concepts will turn 
out to involve a phenomenal state, whereas the content of his 
twin's corresponding phenomenal concept can't possibly involve 
such a state. According to Chalmers, it seems plausible that the 
content of a zombie's phenomenal concepts would be 
schmenomenal states (these would be states that have the same 
physical, functional and intentional properties as Chalmers' states 
but that aren't phenomenally conscious). The physicalist would 
then argue that Chalmers' and Zombie Chalmers' corresponding 
beliefs have the same truth-values and are justified in similar 
ways, but they are quite importantly about different things. So 
Chalmers and Zombie Chalmers can share the same epistemic 
situation after all, just as do Oscar and his twin.  
 
It is indeed ironic that the basis of Carruthers and Veillet's rebuttal of Chalmers' 
argument that Dave and Zombie Dave have different epistemic situations has 
been supplied by Chalmers himself when he clarifies what it means for two 
epistemic situations to be the same. Carruthers and Veillet are correct that 
Chalmers committed a tactical error here. It seems that this tactical error 
occurred when Chalmers resorted to zombie talk in explaining the second horn of 
his dilemma. Perhaps it would have been sufficient for Chalmers to explain this 
horn of the dilemma by simply stating that if P & ~C is not conceivable, then C is 
physically explicable; for if C is physically explicable, then C cannot explain our 
epistemic situation. If the psychological features necessary for our possession of 
phenomenal concepts can be explained in physicalist terms, then our possession 
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of such concepts will not engender an epistemic gap and hence cannot explain 
our epistemic situation with regard to consciousness. However, insofar as the 
master argument is grounded in the zombie argument, Chalmers must show that 
every aspect of the argument is consistent with the zombie argument, and 
Carruthers and Veillet show that Chalmers fails to do so for this particular horn 
of the dilemma.  
 
Chalmers actually anticipates this type of objection raised by Carruthers and 
Veillet to his master argument and provides an elaborate reply (see Chalmers 
2007, 184–187). However, his reply largely comes down to a charge that this 
objection, by attributing schmenomenal states to zombies, contradicts our 
intuition that "when we conceive of zombies, we are not conceiving of beings 
whose inner life is as rich as ours, but different in character" (Chalmers 2007, 
185). Chalmers thinks that the only way to preserve this intuition is to deny that 
zombies have these schmenomenal states, thereby preserving his argument that 
our epistemic situation is different from that of zombies. Chalmers (2007, 185) 
writes, "Where we have substantial knowledge of our phenomenal inner lives, 
zombies have no analogous introspective knowledge…" However, to this reply of 
Chalmers, Carruthers and Veillet simply counter that such an intuition is not 
actually disregarded when we think of zombies as having schmenomenal states, 
for these states, while serving the same functions as our phenomenal states, are 
still not phenomenal. They (2007, 13–14) write,  
 
Well, in our view, zombies are still zombies in that they are not 
phenomenally conscious. Their perceptual states don't have 
phenomenal feels. In this respect, it is all dark inside. Yet they 
have something playing a certain role in their psychology—a 
role analogous to the role that phenomenal consciousness plays 
in ours. They have something epistemically just as good as 
consciousness, but they don't have anything that is phenomenally 
as good. And it seems that this is what matters here… Zombies 
are still, it seems, in quite a dreadful situation. So our intuitions 
about zombies are preserved.  
 
On Two Conceptualisations of C 
 
We now turn to Balog's objection to the master argument. Balog begins her 
analysis of the master argument by highlighting the importance of 
conceptualisation in examining the master argument because the argument makes 
use of conceivability. She (2011, 10) writes, "To get a better handle of Chalmers' 
argument, we need to clarify an important issue here: conceptualisation. 
Conceivability, in all its varieties, is a conceptual matter, and so the evaluation of 
Chalmers' premises will depend on what conceptualization of C we have in 
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mind". Balog then proceeds to distinguish between two conceptualisations of C 
that she believes are consistent with physicalism, namely,  
 
1. CPhen: C conceptualised using phenomenal language. 
2. CPhys: C conceptualised using physical language.  
 
To recall, Chalmers' master argument runs as follows: 
 
P1. If P&~C is conceivable, then C is not physically 
explicable. 
P2.  If P&~C is not conceivable, then C cannot explain our 
epistemic situation. 
_____________ 
 
Either C is not physically explicable, or C cannot explain our 
epistemic situation. 
 
If we consider Balog's two conceptualisations of C, Chalmers' master argument 
would then have the following four versions or reformulations:  
 
Version I: C in P1 and P2 (i.e., Premises 1 and 2) as CPhys  
 
P1.  If P&~CPhys is conceivable, then CPhys is not physically 
explicable. 
P2.  If P&~CPhys is not conceivable, then CPhys cannot explain 
our epistemic situation. 
_____________ 
 
Either CPhys is not physically explicable, or CPhys cannot explain 
our epistemic situation. 
 
Version II: C in P1 and P2 as CPhen  
 
P1.  If P&~CPhen is conceivable, then CPhen is not physically 
explicable. 
P2.  If P&~CPhen is not conceivable, then CPhen cannot explain 
our epistemic situation. 
_____________ 
 
Either CPhen is not physically explicable, or CPhen cannot explain 
our epistemic situation. 
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Version III: C in P1 as CPhys but in P2 as CPhen 
 
P1.  If P&~CPhys is conceivable, then CPhys is not physically 
explicable. 
P2.  If P&~CPhen is not conceivable, then CPhen cannot explain 
our epistemic situation. 
_____________ 
 
Either CPhys is not physically explicable, or CPhen cannot explain 
our epistemic situation. 
 
Version IV: C in P1 as CPhen but in P2 as CPhys 
 
P1.  If P&~CPhen is conceivable, then CPhen i is not physically 
explicable. 
P2.  If P&~CPhys is not conceivable, then CPhys cannot explain 
our epistemic situation. 
_____________ 
 
Either CPhen is not physically explicable, or CPhys cannot explain 
our epistemic situation. 
 
In Balog's analysis, among these four versions of the master argument, the only 
meaningful version is Version IV because P1 in Versions I and III (i.e., If 
P&~CPhys is conceivable, then CPhys is not physically explicable), and P2 in 
Versions II and III (i.e., If P&~CPhen is not conceivable, then CPhen cannot explain 
our epistemic situation) "are vacuously true by virtue of having a false 
antecedent" (Balog 2011, 11). On the one hand, the antecedent of P1 in Versions 
I and III is false simply because P&~CPhys is not conceivable. As Balog (ibid.) 
explains, "Any true fundamental physical description of the world, e.g., CPhys, is 
implied by the full fundamental physical description of the world P…." On the 
other hand, the antecedent of P2 in Versions II and III is false simply because 
P&~CPhen is conceivable. As Balog (2012, 12) explains, "[A]nybody who accepts 
the conceivability of zombies… will have to accept the conceivability of 
'phenomenal concept zombies' (i.e., creatures that are physically identical with us 
but have no phenomenal concepts)…". 
 
By contrast, P1 and P2 in Version IV are true but not vacuously because their 
antecedents are true in the sense that P&~CPhen is indeed conceivable, and 
P&~CPhys is indeed not conceivable (for the reasons stated above). However, 
according to Balog, the conclusion of this version (Version IV), which is "Either 
CPhen is not physically explicable, or CPhys cannot explain our epistemic situation", 
is no threat to physicalism because, 
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1. while CPhen is not physically explicable, CPhys is; and  
2. while CPhys cannot explain our epistemic situation, CPhen 
can. 
 
Here, C is physically explicable (with respect to its conceptualisation as CPhys) 
and can explain our epistemic situation (with respect to its conceptualisation as 
CPhen). As no threat to physicalism, the master argument would then appear, in its 
meaningful form, not really as an objection to the PCS, but as a mere explanation 
of why we have the epistemic gaps. In Balog's own words, "Here is my answer to 
the Master Argument. Yes, it is correct both that CPhen is not physical explicable 
and that CPhys cannot explain our epistemic situation—but this is perfectly 
compatible with physicalism! What I concede here—what the Master Argument 
succeeds at showing—is merely the existence of epistemic gaps—not the 
existence of an ontological gap… P doesn't perspicuously explain CPhen but it 
does perspicuously explain CPhys! Similarly, CPhys doesn't perspicuously explain 
E, but CPhen does" (Balog 2012, 17–18). 
  
It should be noted that in these remarks by Balog, she refers to an explanation 
that she qualifies as perspicuous. To fully appreciate her arguments here, we 
must explore what she means. It can be gleaned from certain remarks by Balog 
(2012, 17–18) that what she means by an explanation being perspicuous is that it 
is non-gappy, and by a non-gappy explanation, she in turn means a type of 
explanation that is clear and less controversial (and hence stronger). For Balog, 
the remarks showing that a non-gappy explanation is a clear explanation are as 
follows. "It seems that for Chalmers, the connection between conceivability and 
explanation is straightforwardly a priori. But, as we have seen, even those who 
reject the connection between conceivability and explanation on general grounds 
(Block and Stalnaker 1999; McLaughlin 2007) have to admit that there is a clear 
sense in which CPhen is not explicable by P: the sense that connects explanation 
with 'non-gappiness' (author's italics)" (Balog 2012, 17).  
 
However, for Balog, the remarks showing that a perspicuous explanation is non-
gappy and that a non-gappy explanation in turn is less controversial and hence a 
stronger type of explanation are as follows.  
 
In any case, Chalmers' Master Argument, couched in terms of conceivability, can 
be reformulated in terms of non-gappy explanation:  
 
1  Gap) If there is an explanatory gap between P and C, then C 
is not physically explicable.  
2  Gap) If there is no explanatory gap between P and C, then C 
cannot explain our epistemic situation.  
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As before, these conditionals break down into two sub-principles depending on 
whether they feature CPhys or CPhen… the author will call the kind of explanation 
figuring in these conditionals—tied, via conceptual necessity to non-gappyness—
perspicuous explanation. In what follows, the author will focus on this—less 
controversial, and so stronger—formulation of Chalmers' Master Argument.  
 
In other words, given the two conceptualisations of C identified by Balog, the 
explanations of Chalmers in his master argument would appear as unclear, 
controversial or non-perspicuous. Thus, when Chalmers states that "If P & ~C is 
conceivable, then C is not physically explicable", it is not clear why C cannot be 
explained physically because it is not clear whether what Chalmers means by C is 
CPhys or CPhen. The same is true of Chalmers' other statement, "If P & ~C is not 
conceivable, then C cannot explain our epistemic situation". What cannot explain 
our epistemic situation here, CPhys or CPhen? These two statements of Chalmers are 
therefore gappy in that they are indeterminate as to their truth-value. To make 
them gappy, Balog reformulates the master argument as rendered in Version IV 
above. However, the consequence of this reformulation is that the master 
argument turns out not to be an objection to the PCS.  
  
For Balog's objection to the master argument to be fully successful, however, she 
also must account for the new epistemic gaps that will arise (a) between P and 
CPhen and (b) between CPhen and CPhys in a manner that will not necessitate an 
ontological gap. Regarding the epistemic gap that will arise between P and CPhen, 
Balog explains that it likewise is due to the very nature of phenomenal concepts. 
In other words, while C explains the epistemic gap between P and consciousness, 
C also explains the second-level epistemic gap between P and C, and Balog 
believes that there is no need to posit a higher level C, thereby preventing a 
regress of explanation. Anticipating this type of defence of the PCS, however, 
Chalmers (2007, 181) charges that the type of explanation that Balog presents 
leads to circularity. In her response, Balog (2012, 19) does not deny the charge of 
circularity but rejects the implication that her explanation, or the PCS for that 
matter, is therefore wrong. Balog claims that the circularity in her explanation is 
not vicious, and in her footnote to this part of the discussion (Footnote 31), she 
further notes, following some commentators, that "circularity by itself doesn't 
make an argument defective".  
 
With regard to the question of whether the epistemic gap that will arise between 
CPhen and CPhys will lead to an ontological gap, Balog (2012, 18) simply answers, 
"… CPhen and CPhys, according to the physicalist, express the same fact. To rebut 
the anti-physicalist, the proponent of the PCS merely has to argue that this is 
conceivable. If it is conceivable, then the fact that P doesn't perspicuously explain 
CPhen doesn't a priori entail that CPhen is not physical". In short, CPhen and CPhys are 
regarded merely as two different modes of presenting (in the Fregean sense) the 
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same physical fact, and according to Balog, the mere conceivability of this 
concept is enough to rebut the (necessary) claim that CPhen and CPhys refer to two 
different types of facts, physical and non-physical, that would then lead to an 
ontological gap. 
 
Conclusion  
 
We need to clarify here whether the issue concerning the PCS concerns the truth 
of physicalism or merely its viability as an ontological position. The epistemic 
arguments are intended to show that physicalism is false, and the PCS is intended 
to prove that epistemic arguments fail to do that. From the perspective of the 
proponents of the PCS, what the PCS intends to accomplish is not to actually 
prove that physicalism is true but to save the viability of physicalism from the 
epistemic arguments. The PCS is therefore merely a defensive argument against 
the epistemic arguments and not a positive argument for the truth of physicalism. 
As Carruthers and Veillet (2007, 17) explain, "… the phenomenal concept 
strategy is essentially a defensive strategy. It is a strategy that physicalists 
employ to show that the key anti-physicalist arguments fail. It isn't meant to 
make a positive case for the truth of physicalism…". In this regard, the author 
thinks the PCS is able to do its intended job: it has successfully shown why the 
epistemic arguments do not necessarily prove that physicalism is wrong. 
Chalmers' master argument against the PCS is a powerful one, but the author 
thinks Carruthers, Veillet and Balog are able to defend the PCS against the 
master argument quite well.  
 
Finally, with regard to the larger debate between physicalists and non-
physicalists on the fundamental nature of reality, which has motivated the 
epistemic arguments, the PCS, Chalmers' master argument, and the physicalist 
objections to the master argument, the author concurs with Balog that it is a 
stalemate, for as Balog (2012, 20) states, "The anti-physicalist appeals to the anti-
physicalist principles, the physicalist appeals to the conceivability of a purely 
physical world with phenomenality. Both can show that, once granted that one 
core assumption, their view is consistent and can rebut challenges from the other 
side. Neither side can, without begging the question against the opponent, show 
that the other's position is untenable. Where you end up depends on what you 
take as your starting point".  
 
How can one, for instance, objectively decide which of the two equally 
conceivable scenarios about CPhen and CPhys is true: one, that they refer to the 
same physical fact; the other, that they refer to two different types of facts—one 
physical and the other non-physical? In addition, how can one objectively decide 
which of the two equally conceivable scenarios about zombies is true5: one, that 
they do not have something analogous to the phenomenal states of humans—the 
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so-called schmenomenal states; the other, that they do have these schmenomenal 
states?6  
 
Notes 
 
1. Perhaps on a fine-grained level mental facts can be differentiated from phenomenal facts 
in the following way: mental facts are facts about mental states and conscious 
experiences such as the facts that the author has a belief and that the author is in pain, 
whereas phenomenal facts are facts about the subjective qualities of the mental states and 
conscious experiences that we are undergoing, such as the facts that the author feels good 
about thinking of a particular belief of mine and that the author feels irritated upon 
hearing a certain type of music. In this essay, the author is not particular about this 
difference, and the author regards mental facts and phenomenal facts as generally the 
same. One reason for this approach is that mental facts are essentially defined by their 
phenomenal character.  
2. The author calls these types of physicalists non-realist physicalists, under which the 
author classifies the reductive and eliminative physicalists (see Mabaquiao 2012, 19–40). 
Physicalists belonging to this group essentially reject the idea that there is something over 
and above the brain's neural states or the body's behavioural dispositions. 
3. The author calls these types of physicalists realist physicalists, under which the author 
classifies physicalists who regard mental states as higher-level physical states or as 
physical states that are higher than the brain's neural states and the body's behavioural 
dispositions (see Mabaquiao 2012, 19–40). 
4. The author would like to thank the reviewer of this paper for noting the inaccuracy of 
simplifying the reference of C to that of phenomenal concepts per se, which the author 
did in the first draft of this paper.  
5. In his reply to the type of objection raised by Carruthers and Veillet to his master 
argument, Chalmers (2007, 187) states, "Perhaps it is conceivable that a nonconscious 
duplicate could have some analogous state, schmonsciousnesss, of which they have 
analogous introspective knowledge. But it is also conceivable that a nonconscious 
duplicate would have no such analogous introspective knowledge. And this latter 
conceivability claim is all that the argument against the phenomenal concept strategy 
needs". However, then Carruthers and Veillet can easily reply that the former 
conceivability is all that the phenomenal concept strategy needs to defend itself against 
the master argument.  
6. The author would like to express his gratitude to the reviewer of this paper for his/her 
sharp comments and helpful suggestions and to Dr. Jeremiah Joven Joaquin for his 
constructive insights on the initial version of this paper.  
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